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RELIGIoN aND EThICS IN ThE 
ThoUGhT oF RIChaRD ULLMaNN
t. vail palmer, Jr.
Richard k. ullmann (1904-1963) was born in Germany and re- ceived his Ph .D . from Frankfurt University . after a period in Bu-
chenwald concentration camp, he left Germany in 1939 and eventually 
settled in Birmingham, England . In 1946 he became a member of the 
Society of Friends . he wrote many articles which were published in 
The Friend (London) and a number of articles in other Quaker pub-
lications, particularly The Friends’ Quarterly and Der Quäker . Several 
poems, in German, also appeared in Der Quäker . his more substantial 
publications include the 1961 Swarthmore Lecture, Tolerance and the 
Intolerable, and a posthumous Pendle hill Pamphlet, The Dilemmas 
of a Reconciler . his thought is expressed most completely in a 1955 
essay, Friends and Truth, and in a book, Between God and history, 
published in 1959 .
quakerism and existentialism: a dialectic
To understand the relationships between Richard Ullmann’s religious 
thought and his ideas and actions in social ethics, we must begin with 
his strong affirmation of “the dialectical nature of truth .”1  The term 
“dialectical” has a variety of meanings in the history of philosophy and 
of theology; but most of those who call themselves “dialectical” think-
ers mean, at least, either that fuller truth is best approached through 
dialogue between persons who hold contrasting views or that progress 
in truth comes through the paradoxical affirmation of truths that appear 
to contradict each other and the attempt to resolve that tension through 
the development of a synthesis involving insights from both sides of 
the paradox . Richard Ullmann clearly means that truth is dialectical in 
both senses of the term .
Thus, he insists, beginning with whatever truth I now possess, 
“more truth can be found only in boundless communication .”2  Fur-
thermore, no statement of belief, however evidently false, can be simply 
discarded or ignored; at the very least there is “the truth which is hidden 
even in the most fallacious beliefs of our fellowman, namely, that his 
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greatest error is still true in so far as it is a valid test of our own truth .”3  
If this be the nature of truth, then even though there is such a thing 
as “the deceiver” or “the false or the mistaken prophet,” nevertheless 
“the publishing of truth is in itself full of ambiguities .”4 
a consequence of the dialectical nature of truth, in both senses of 
the term “dialectical,” is that the discovery of truth is a never-ending 
process: “Search is an essential aspect of truth .”5  all presently affirmed 
truth is of necessity incomplete; the very fact that the discovery of truth 
proceeds endlessly is an assurance of yet more truth to be found: “Dis-
satisfaction with my present knowledge of truth is…profound certainty 
about that greater truth which I do not know .”6 
In the nature of the case, all dialectical systems of philosophy and 
theology must be quite complex . This is certainly true of Ullmann’s 
thought . It will be possible here only to examine those portions of his 
system that most clearly point up the relationship between theology 
and social ethics .
Richard Ullmann draws heavily on two sources for the basis of his 
own theology: the seventeenth-century Quakers and twentieth-century 
existentialists—particularly karl Jaspers, but to some extent such think-
ers as Gabriel Marcel, Paul Tillich, and Martin Buber . he describes his 
method as “that of mirroring Quakerism in existentialist philosophy,”7  
but it might be more appropriate to describe his approach as a dialogue 
between early Friends and existentialists . Dialogue it must be, for no 
individual or group can possess the whole truth . The failure to recognize 
this point is, for Richard Ullmann, one of the primary shortcomings of 
George Fox and the first Friends: “Fox’s unwarranted claim of infal-
libility…is a central part of his doctrines, and only if we grasp it as such, 
need we not feel altogether discouraged by the fact that his certainty 
has been lost for our generation .”8  a corollary of this weakness is an 
equally unwarranted intolerance of the views of non-Friends: “Do not 
Fox’s words…create the feeling that he and his Friends alone know 
the truth or at least the only true way to truth?…This is, I am afraid, 
just another kind of intolerance .”9  
Parallel to their understanding of truth was the way in which early 
Friends dealt with the paradox of the second coming of Christ and 
the coming of the kingdom of God—the truths that Christ and the 
kingdom have already come and that their full coming lies still in the 
future: “Early Friends, however, do not conceive this paradox as a 
tension within individual human experience, they try to solve the ten-
sion in a simple and direct way . The kingdom, they hold, is altogether 
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present and fulfilled for those who know that Christ is come into their 
hearts as their immediate teacher; whereas it is still in the future for 
those who have not yet been convinced .”10  Clearly, Ullmann finds this 
solution altogether too “simple and direct .” Related to the early Quaker 
conviction that, for them, the kingdom of God has already arrived is 
what Ullmann calls Fox’s “historical ingratitude”:
The sweeping gesture with which he removed all history between 
“the apostles’ days” and the Second Coming of Christ as a “long 
night of apostasy”…is symptomatic of the exaggerated view 
which he has about inner guidance, as entirely divorced from all 
temporal continuity .… Fox did not recognize any of the influ-
ences which had worked upon him, neither those of the spiritual 
reformers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries nor those of 
such contemporaries as created for him, and together with him, 
the historical climate for his ministry .11  
But the method cannot be simply one of using existentialist insights 
to correct the weaknesses of early Quaker thought, for there are also 
weaknesses in the thought of the existentialists, even of karl Jaspers, 
on whom Richard Ullmann depends most heavily . For example, among 
the existentialists, including Jaspers, “little positive thought is given to 
the experience of the ‘we,’ not as depersonalized collective, but as true 
community .”12  In particular, Jaspers omits an aspect of the “we” that 
Friends have often emphasized: “Though Jaspers emphasizes repeatedly 
that truth exists only in communication, I am not sure that corporate 
guidance would have a place in his thinking .”13  Ullmann also accuses 
Jaspers of an inadequate understanding of mysticism:
Jaspers…is certainly wrong when he asserts…that after what he 
calls the “trance,” the mystic does “basically no longer under-
stand” his experience even though he may “remember” it and 
have his life changed by it . It is illogical to equate the inability of 
communicating in words what is the most essential in mystical 
experience, with a fading understanding of it . Jaspers speaks sev-
eral times of self-communication and communication in silence, 
but strangely enough our Quaker silence is for him no silence 
of communication… . The mystics know what Jaspers is very 
reluctant to think, and what apparently has not become lucid to 
him at the boundaries of thought: that though he cannot master 
Truth, he is still mastered by it; that though he cannot possess 
Truth, he is still possessed by it .14  
3
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In describing the early Friends here as mystics, Ullmann is apparently 
using “mysticism” in its broadest sense to denote religious experience in 
general; he is at pains elsewhere to deny that Quaker mysticism has much 
to do with hindu or Buddhist or even medieval Christian mysticism .
Thus when Richard Ullmann turns to the positive contributions 
early Friends make to the dialogue, he is careful to correct some of the 
popular contemporary misunderstandings of early Quaker thought . 
he takes George Fox’s phrase, “that of God in every one,” which has 
become a popular Quaker catchword today, and points out: “as a matter 
of historical accuracy, the Quaker phrase of ‘that of God’ was neither 
meant, nor often asserted to denote, a pantheistic Creative Power or 
Life Force .” Instead, it simply points to “a God-given capacity” that 
“enables man, and man alone in the known creation, to experience 
God Transcendent intimately and immediately, and thus to encounter 
Truth so that he is seized by it and knows it to be true and tries to 
know it as, and express it in, his own truths . That capacity, however, 
must not be identified with God himself, it is that from God rather 
than that part of God .”15 
one of the chief contributions of Quakerism, according to Ullmann, 
is the understanding that truth is always subject to growth and change: 
“The dynamic concept of truth has been one of the most characteristic 
Quaker dogmas throughout our history .”16  More concretely, Quakers 
have discovered that shared dialogue and communication can and do 
lead to a shared experience of the presence of the transcendent God 
and thus open the way for the development of full community, not 
only among a few close-knit individuals but also among ever widening 
circles of humankind:
Just as a self finds himself and his truth in the face of Tran-
scendence, intercommunication may bring a group of selves 
into a common experience of Transcendence in Presence .… 
Intersubjectivity may, in intercommunication, work its way up 
to an inclusive community or oneness in Truth, and this, as 
the experience of Friends shows, not only in quite small circles . 
authentic communication achieved in this way…is full togeth-
erness in which the members are concerned not so much with 
seeking out one another in the search for truth than with receiving 
truth in the common openness to Transcendence .17 
another important contribution of the early Quakers is the idea and 
experience that the kingdom of God is already present in the midst of 
his people: “It is the experience of the presence of the kingdom and 
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not the utopian hope for a territorial kingdom on earth which prompts 
Quaker action .”18 
The contributions of existentialists to the dialogue begun with their 
emphasis on the individual: “The relevance of existentialist philosophy” 
is that “in an age where collectivism and depersonalization threaten to 
deprive man of his individuality,…it has turned our eyes back to the 
unconditional self, my self, my responsibility for myself, and the freedom 
of my isolated ‘existence .’” This is even the case for existentialists such 
as Buber and Jaspers who have also emphasized “that my self stands 
individually and responsibly in relation not only to myself, but to other 
selves and to the world and to what transcends the world . I have to 
decide for myself what that relation is to be; and this can be done only 
by me alone where I am most true to my self .”19 
In terms of the discovery of truth, this means that “I cannot have 
truth unless I find it in and for myself .”20  In this sense, the existential-
ists emphasize “the subjectivity of truth .”21  Ullmann also draws on the 
existentialists for his insight that it is ultimate truth toward which we 
move even though our search for it is always incomplete; he can affirm 
“that inner certainty of truth eternal which upholds us though we can 
never know it .”22  From the existentialists also comes the insight that 
“truth is, and can be, mediated only in symbols and parables .”23  This 
is particularly the case with religious truth: “all utterances about God, 
from the mere fact that he transcends human thought, are of necessity 
only parabolical .”24  Ullmann takes this point specifically from Paul 
Tillich’s Love, Power, and Justice; he fails to note that Tillich later 
insisted on one major exception to this generalization: “The statement 
that God is being-itself is a nonsymbolic statement .…It means what 
it says directly and properly .…Nothing else can be said about God as 
God which is not symbolic .”25 
In his understanding of history, Richard Ullmann is also very much 
in line with existentialist thought: “The unique remains the most im-
portant factor in history .”26  But as he moves further with this line of 
thought, we may suspect a weakness or incompleteness in his dialectic: 
“I do not believe that God, having created man with the capacity of 
having history, intervenes in history directly in the way proclaimed by 
the prophets of old .”27  The problem is that neither early Friends, with 
their “historical ingratitude” and their premature resolution of the 
tension between history and the kingdom of God, nor existentialists, 
with their essentially non-historical emphasis on the centrality of the 
isolated individual, provide Ullmann with much of a handle to get hold 
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of the ideas of God’s revelation and action in history . In order to do 
justice to these ideas, which are quite basic to Christian faith, he would 
have to bring some group such as the hebrew prophets or the modern 
“salvation-history” theologians more fully into the dialogue with the 
existentialists and the early Friends . But this he hesitated to do . Perhaps 
the dialogue with Marxist thought, which he was beginning to approach 
at the end of his life, would eventually have provided him with a way 
of dealing more concretely with the importance and reality of history 
as a medium through which Transcendence could be expressed?
The heart of Ullmann’s dialogue between Friends and existentialist 
thinkers emerges in his existentialist interpretation of some key themes 
in early Quaker thought and experience . he can, for instance, reinter-
pret some typical early Quaker religious language:
It is at least inaccurate to assert that the experience of Christ 
Within meant for early Friends the same thing as divine imma-
nence .… Religious experience was for them an I-thou experi-
ence .… It seems quite possible for an on-looking witness to say 
of a fellow-man that he is filled with God and his Spirit . For the 
inspired person himself, however, it seems more fitting,…as a 
more accurate description of his actual experience, to declare that 
the Spirit of the Lord is upon him and that God speaks, not in 
him and from him, but to him and through him . Such shades of 
language are not without significance for the underlying truth .28 
Ullmann says of the early Friends: “The truth they published was 
that you cannot have truth unless you find it for yourself: truth is 
existential .”29  Even the Quaker abstention from creeds can be seen as 
a consequence of the symbolic, non-literal nature of religious truth: 
“The miracle of conversion…consists in the possibility of communica-
tion…beyond the conveyance of contents .…The small group is released 
from its separateness, the lonely soul from its bewilderment, because 
they have suddenly been given a language to intercommunicate on 
something that cannot be really communicated except to those who 
already know .”30 
The thought of karl Jaspers can provide a fuller understanding of 
the early Quaker practice of publishing truth: “For Quakerism, how-
ever, Jaspers’ analysis of communication yields an important insight, 
namely that publishing truth is not only a declaration of truths already 
found: it is an essential tool in our search for truths still to be found, 
as truth is accomplished only in and through communication .”31  The 
existentialist analysis of I-thou communication also helps to explain the 
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method of the Quaker meeting for business: “If we check individual 
guidance by corporate judgments, these are reached…by a corporate, 
but corporately subjective, discernment of the spirit, achieved in inter-
subjective communication .”32 
the central principle of christian ethics
Ullmann draws on existentialism for his central principle of Christian 
ethics—the command to become our true, authentic selves: “Direc-
tives of attitudes are commandments to be what we are, to attain our 
authentic self . The true self is the will of God for us .”33  This basic 
principle drives behind the usual distinction in ethical thought between 
teleological ethics (emphasizing goals or results of action, such as the 
“utilitarian” emphasis on maximizing pleasure for the greatest num-
ber of people) and deontological ethics (emphasizing moral rules or 
principles, the form of action, or the motive behind the action) . “The 
traditional distinction between utilitarian ethics and ethics of principle 
falls to the ground .…Not what I hold on principle nor what I want 
to achieve, but what I truly am, the will of God for me, makes me act 
rightly . My whole self is involved .”34  In particular, we can never say that 
any particular type or form of action is always automatically right: “It is 
never a category of action as such which can rightly be called Christian, 
but only an action in a situation undertaken by a fully authentic self .”35 
The attainment of our true self comes most deeply in religious 
experience, the I-thou encounter with God: “This, what we really are, 
our authentic self, happens to us in the spiritual experience of encoun-
tering God . The revelation of God’s will is not like a moral law to be 
executed, it is like a structure of being which is real, and which is real 
not only as God’s will for you and me but also, as far as we can discern, 
as God’s own Nature or Being .”36 
Ullmann often uses the phrase, “structure of being,” to character-
ize the true selfhood which lies at the heart of authentic morality . It 
is difficult to dig out precisely what he means by the term, “structure 
of being .” one implication of the term, clearly, is the importance of 
self-awareness: “The deeper a man’s awareness of the structure of 
being, the more consistently will he fuse principle and expediency in 
the concrete situation,…by his whole being expressing God’s will for 
him .”37  Further, Ullmann makes a clear distinction between the true 
self, the structure of being, and the historical conditions or situation 
within which the self acts; a person “does not escape the tension between 
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his true self and the conditions of action in which he is involved .”38  
although these two poles—structure of being and the conditions of 
history—cannot be severed in practice, they can be distinguished in 
basic theory: “The structure of being, the ground of our true self, is 
therefore always intermingled with the stuff of history and incarnate in 
our own historicity, and unfortunately never appears as unadulterated 
as in our abstract thinking about it .”39 
he does not go far beyond this in explaining the meaning of the 
“structure of being .” But this reticence about his basic ethical principle 
is characteristic of existentialist thought; to describe too concretely what 
another person must be, let alone do, is to run the risk of depriving that 
person of his ultimate radical responsibility to choose freely what he or 
she is to be and to do . one consequnce is that existentialist thought 
often moves toward a “situational” or “contextual” ethics, in which 
only a full knowledge of a given situation (including the nature of the 
self which is to act in that situation) can tell us what is right or wrong 
in that situation . Richard Ullmann does avoid a complete contextual-
ism in his ethics, but that is because of further principles he develops, 
to supplement his basic principle of authentic selfhood .
the development of christian ethics 
Ullmann affirms the dictum that goes back to Socrates, that it is worse 
to do wrong than to suffer from the wrongdoing of others; the Chris-
tian, he insists, “should consider his own peril the lesser of two evils .”40  
This principle is also extended to actions that the Christian takes in 
responsibility for the groups to which he or she belongs: “What the 
Christian can and ought to do…is to recognize that he ought to ignore 
unpleasant consequences for himself and, at least to a certain extent, 
for his community, if the rightness of action in a concrete situation 
depends on this .”41  Richard Ullmann carries this doctrine concerning 
“unpleasant consequences” through to its logical conclusion, to cases 
where death itself may be the consequence of an action: “We should 
act as though death was the ultimate evil and the end of everything for 
others, but not for ourselves .”42 
Combining this emphasis on suffering rather than doing evil with the 
existentialist insistence on absolute individual freedom and responsibil-
ity, Ullmann suggests that the highest form of moral action may take 
the form of a creative risk: “The creative risk, taken with responsibility 
and goodwill, is not sinful, however deep the sense of guilt, if a creative 
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risk has led to destruction . on the contrary, if there were no risk, our 
action would not be free and responsible .”43 
he deepens the concepts of creative risk and of suffering rather than 
doing wrong by seeing them in the light of the cross of Jesus Christ . 
he discusses the decision of George Fox and the early Friends, during 
the crisis of 1659, not to accept the invitation from Sir henry Vane to 
help forestall the restoration of the monarchy by becoming magistrates 
and commissioners of the militia . an apparent “domestication” of the 
earlier radical social protest of the Friends was implicit in this decision . 
Richard Ullmann argues regarding Fox’s action: “Do we not see that his 
‘domestication’ was a Christian choice under divine guidance, namely 
the portentous final decision for suffering evil rather than inflicting it? 
That he chose the cross of persecution rather than the bloody rule of 
the saints?”44 
Ullmann applies the example of the cross to such problems as the 
conflict between truth and love which the reconciler often faces . “all 
work and reconciliation depends on the reconciler’s own ability to 
reconcile truth and love within himself,”45  and the supreme example 
of such an inward reconciliation is “symbolized in the person of Jesus, 
the reconciler between God and man, and man and fellow-man . The 
means by which Jesus reconciled truth and love in and through himself 
was the cross .”46 
With his emphases on reconciliation, on creative risk, on treating 
the death of others as the greatest evil, on the corporate dimension 
of suffering rather than inflicting evil, it is no surprise that Richard 
Ullmann strongly supports the traditional Quaker peace testimony . 
“our testimony is no testimony of prevention, reduction, resistance, 
opposition and protest: it is a tremendously positive response to the 
promptings of love, goodness, purity and truth,” he writes; “our actions 
will not be merely re-active to militarism and the threat of destruction, 
but will respond actively, creatively and positively to the promptings of 
the Spirit of Love, Truth and Peace .”47  This rejection of war under any 
circumstances is perhaps his clearest departure from the “situational 
ethics” of most existentialists .
What may be surprising is that he appeals to his basic ethical principle 
of authentic selfhood or the structure of being, as a foundation for the 
rejection of all participation in war:
 action undertaken in the responsibility of the authentic self 
depends on the full inner awareness (though not necessarily 
9
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fully grasped intellectually) of the structure of being . It is for 
this reason that while some actions may sometimes be right and 
at other times wrong (for instance, the offer or acceptance of an 
alcoholic drink…), other actions like warfare or cannibalism can 
never be right in any conceivable situation because they destroy in 
themselves the structure of being which is the ground of true 
selfhood, and are therefore self-destructive . So there are no ac-
tions which are as such Christian, but there are actions which are 
never Christian .48  
It is apparent that Ullmann intends to base the peace testimony in the 
dialogue between existentialists and early Friends . What is not quite 
clear is whether war destroys the structure of being in the person do-
ing the killing, in the person killed, or in the relationships between 
the two .
When it comes to the question of applying the Friends’ peace testi-
mony to practical affairs, to social and political issues of the day, Richard 
Ullmann refers to W . Grigor McClelland’s typology of the “prophet” 
and the “reconciler” and puts himself squarely in the camp of the rec-
oncilers . he thus opposes one of the programs favored by many radical 
pacifists or “prophets,” Stephen king-hall’s proposal for organized 
training for non-violent national defense: “our answer to Sir Stephen 
should be: no training for non-violent resistance against the Russians, 
but a deeper understanding of Christ’s way, and an unending search 
for the heart of enemy and friend alike, in order to reconcile them .”49 
In one respect, Ullmann is a rather unusual Quaker “reconciler .” 
The typical reconciler tends to emphasize contacts with national and 
United Nations officials and governmental bodies, urging the increased 
use of negotiation, conciliation, and persuasion in international affairs . 
Richard Ullmann, however, concentrated his efforts on work at the 
“middle” level of influence- and opinion-leadership in society . In par-
ticular, he participated intensively in dialogues between american and 
western European Christians and church leaders from eastern Europe, 
held under the auspices of the Christian Peace Conference . In the last 
two sections of this essay, I will discuss how these dialogues impacted 
the development of his own thought .
I have suggested elsewhere that the prophet and the reconciler 
tend to differ sharply in their fundamental social analysis . The recon-
ciler, for one, “sees society, at every level, as a texture of relationships 
between individuals .” For him “the essential ingredient for improving 
international relations…is dialogue, conversation; and conversation is 
20 • t. vail palmer, Jr.
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a relationship between individual perons .”50  Ullmann’s existentialist 
emphasis on the individual and on dialogue certainly aligns him with 
this type of social analysis . I have also suggested that the weaknesses 
of this type of social theory include “its failure to take into account 
the corporate dimension of human society, the interdependent reality 
of social groups and of individuals in their acts and behavior, and its 
consequent lack of any serious grappling with the problem of power as 
a primary factor in the interaction, at various levels, of social groups .”51  
This criticism appears to be borne out in relation to Ullmann’s discus-
sion of justice and love . he writes:
Justice consists of weighing right and wrong, but love carries 
neither scales nor a sword .… 
Justice, it appears, is not the road to love; it is rather a stumbling 
block on it .… 
only the yielding of one’s rights, the willingness of taking risks 
instead of imposing them on others;…only the policy of self-
effacing love can bring us nearer to human brotherhood .52 
This rejection of justice as a social ideal does not imply any unconcern 
for the plight of the poor and the oppressed: “happiness, brotherhood 
and wholeness are a matter of being, namely of men and women being 
more closely the selves they are meant to be . The condition of being, 
however, is having, namely having the minimum livelihood in order 
to be healthy and happy for oneself and one’s nearest and dearest, and 
indeed having in order to be able to share both by giving and receiv-
ing .”53  To be able to make such an affirmation without insisting on 
justice as a first step toward love and brotherhood would seem to be 
possible only if one overlooks the power of entrenched social structures 
in perpetuating wide divergences in personal wealth, the dimension 
of social power that is often referred to as institutionalized injustice .
Richard Ullmann’s emphasis on dialogue as central to interpersonal 
relations and to society as a whole leads him to emphasize speech 
and conversation as a form of religious and social action . he refers 
to “speech, that most directly ‘telling’ of all human actions .”54  one 
consequence is that “the sharp separation of freedom of opinion and 
speech from freedom of action is quite unrealistic . human speech is 
one of the most effective forms of human action, for good and ill .”55 
his emphasis on speech, on dialogue, on communication leads him 
to emphasize tolerance as a fundamental social value . he bases the 
call to tolerance on fundamental premises of Quaker theology: “The 
religion and ethics in the thought of richard ullmann • 21 
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Universal Inner Light, the Light of Christ shining in every man, the 
realization of God’s inward immediacy to each soul through whatever 
outward mediation, makes tolerance a necessity of thought .”56  In 
particular, tolerance is a necessity in the continuing quest for truth: 
“Tolerance is the very battleground on which the war for truth must 
be waged .”57  This is because the very dialogue that is essential to the 
discovery of further truth is possible only if there is mutual tolerance 
among the parties to the dialogue: “Just because more truth can be 
found only in boundless communication, it is through tolerance, which 
alone makes such communication possible, that truth is stood for and 
falsehood denied .”58 
Ullmann insists that tolerance is not to be confused with mere 
indifference about the beliefs of others which we tolerate: 
Tolerance, far from being indifferent, depends on the fact of dif-
ference: it is a way of meeting difference which has been clearly 
recognized as such; and we cannot meet difference unless we 
are sufficiently interested in it to feel its challenge and to wrestle 
with it .… 
Before we ever become capable of tolerance, and before it can 
ever exist in any true sense, we must be shaken by the recogni-
tion that there are profound differences between ourselves and 
others, and that nobody can be really indifferent to the truths 
which imbue his whole existence .59  
The ultimate test of tolerance comes when we come face to face with 
that which is intolerable, and “injury of the humanity of man by man 
is the intolerable, as far as we humans can conceive it .”60  Examples of 
the intolerable would be National Socialism in Germany during the 
1930s and apartheid as practiced until very recently in South africa .
The Christian must not oppose the intolerable by forms of attack 
or resistance—violent or non-violent—which seek to destroy the per-
petrator of that evil . The final answer to the intolerable, the ultimate 
expression of tolerance, is the way of Jesus Christ, symbolized and 
exemplified by the cross:
It is, then, the message conveyed by the life and death of Jesus 
Christ, not as preached in sermons and observed in churches and 
meeting houses—it is Jesus’ own witness to his cross which con-
tains the exemplary answer to our problem . Standing for truth, 
resisting in love, enduring to the last, this was his threefold way 
when he confronted man’s inhumanity with his divinely human 
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dignity .…Through the manner of his living and dying, the cross of 
Christ has emerged as the supreme symbol and pattern of meeting 
the intolerable by something far greater than tolerance . Wherever 
the cross has been seen, understood and experienced in this way, 
it has redeemed and fitted human beings to take upon themselves 
the loving struggle for truth, at whatever cost .61 
dialogue with east-european christians
Richard Ullmann’s entry into dialogue with east-European Christians 
has been dramatically depicted by his widow:
Like all western Christians, Richard met Christians in the East 
very critically . a decisive breakthrough came for him in Frank-
furt in 1959, when for the first time he met church leaders from 
the East . he expressed himself so freely and openly that he was 
greatly astonished when he was then and there invited to Prague . 
In Frankfurt he did not foresee how strongly this movement 
would capture his heart . Now in Prague he saw that there were 
real Christians in the East, who answered for their faith amidst 
great outward and inward struggles, and that their work for world 
peace was just as genuine as that of the contenders for peace in 
the West . only the vocabulary was different .62  
The Frankfurt meeting was a theological conference for East-West un-
derstanding, held January 10-13, 1959 . The Prague meeting, to which 
Lene Ullmann referred, was the second Christian Peace Conference, 
april 16-19, 1959 . Richard Ullmann also attended the third Christian 
Peace Conference, in Prague, September 6-9, 1960 . Meanwhile he had 
been appointed to a small working commission of the C .P .C ., which 
planned and organized the first all-Christian Peace assembly . he met 
with this commission april 20-22, 1960, in Debrecen, hungary .
at the all-Christian Peace assembly, held June 13-18, 1961, in 
Prague, Richard Ullmann gave one of the major addresses, on the 
topic, “From the Cold War towards Real Peace .” Immediately after 
that assembly, in response to a last-minute invitation, he and his wife 
flew to Moscow for a one-week visit .
In December 1962, he addressed a regional conference of the Chris-
tian Peace Conference, in Driebergen, Netherlands, on the topic, “Peace 
and Freedom .” Immediately before that meeting, he had been named a 
Vice-President of the Christian Peace Conference . Shortly afterwards, 
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on December 11, 1962, a regional committee of the Christian Peace 
Conference was formed in Great Britain, with Richard k . Ullmann as 
its chairman . his work for the C .P .C . was brought to an end by his 
death in august 1963 .
dialogue with marxism
although Ullmann did not himself have many direct contacts with 
Marxists or with persons from eastern Europe other than church leaders, 
he did give close attention, in his posthumous Dilemmas of a Recon-
ciler, to the report by a group of five american young Friends, of their 
summer tour with three young Russians (Paul Lacey, ed ., Experiment 
in Understanding, Washington, D .C .: Young Friends Committee of 
North america, 1959) . he noted particularly the problems and po-
tentialities of the discussions and dialogues among these Quaker and 
Marxist young people .
It is not surprising that Richard Ullmann has more to say about 
Marxist thought and practice in his writings from 1959 on, than in 
what he had written earlier . his earlier comments had mainly been 
negatively critical of Marxism . In his references to Marxism and to the 
Soviet Union after 1958, his approach becomes more one of critical 
appreciation . he strikes the keynote for this approach in his address to 
the 1961 all-Christian Peace assembly:
as long as we look at things from an ideological viewpoint, we 
cannot see people as Christian .… 
our thoughts fail to meet one another as long as we think 
statically and ideologically .…Instead we must discover on all sides 
the buds of dynamical developments .63 
In the context of this address to Christians from both sides of the Iron 
Curtain, he makes it clear that the “ideological viewpoints” to which 
he refers include both the rigid anti-Communism of many western 
Christians and the uncritical support given by many eastern Christians 
to Communist interpretations of international issues .
he also makes it clear that Marxism itself is not always rigidly bound 
to a static ideology, and he criticizes those who persist in viewing Com-
munism as monolithic:
We are so sure of the monolithic character of communist societies 
that we bother very little with the signs of life even within the 
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framework of Marxist-Leninist ideology (“they are all alike”) .64 
historically…Soviet Communism has already been through very 
different stages and has very different aspects, some of which were 
due to its reactions to Western aggression .65 
one question in which Ullman is interested is that of the relation-
ships between Communism and Christianity . In particular, he insists 
that the sharp anti-communism of many Christian spokesmen “is most 
welcome to the Communist leaders, because it confirms so clearly their 
doctrine of the inherent and ‘corrosive’ evil of Christianity and all 
religion . These leaders are far more bewildered by Christians who co-
operate with them both with appreciation of their constructive efforts, 
and with Christian, critical detachment regarding obvious wrongs . This 
attitude does not fit their books .”66  The major developments during the 
1960s, in the way of Christian-Marxists dialogues in Europe, had not 
taken place when Ullmann wrote this . By 1965 or 1968, had he lived, 
he could have noted that a number of Marxist thinkers were finding 
ways of fitting these newer Christian attitudes into their understanding 
of religion . But even in his visits to Czechoslovakia, Poland, and hun-
gary in 1959 and 1960, Richard Ullmann is able to note the mutual 
perplexities of Christians and Communists, the type of ferment which 
is about to break open into full dialogue: “I am deeply moved by the 
perplexities under which people over there live and work: not only the 
Christians but, through their Christian witness, the Communists .”67  
one aspect of the relationship between Communism and religion 
is the question of religious toleration in socialist countries . Ullmann 
points out that official Marxist atheism does not result, as many in the 
West believe, in a policy that aims at the ruthless extermination of all 
religion:
Let us…look at the major criticism made by Christians against 
Communism, namely, its atheism . Most Communists would deny 
with sincere passion that they infringe religious toleration . all 
they demand is that Christians, Jews, Mohammedans or Bud-
dhists living in their realms should have a positive attitude to the 
socialist structure of their society .… 
The demand for conformity to the laws of the land and the 
structure of socialist society is not fundamentally different from 
what many Western societies expect from their own Christian 
citizens .…
15
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 It is no longer possible to think of the atheistic propaganda in 
Communist countries as a form of religious persecution, except 
perhaps in the German Democratic Republic where the more 
active interference with religious liberty is probably due to the 
fact that its churches are organizationally affiliated with the West 
German churches .…People are free to retain their faith if they 
accept certain civic disabilities, of a kind similar to those suffered 
by non-conformists and Roman Catholics in this country before 
emancipation and enfranchisement, a hundred and thirty years 
ago .68 
all in all, Richard Ullmann neither accepts Communist atheism nor 
attacks it as an intolerable evil:
If we reject Communist atheism, as we must, because it deprives 
man, as the image of God, of his security in God, we still cannot 
reject it as the intolerable, but only as a different faith which must 
be opposed on the battleground of tolerance, precisely in the way 
in which we would have to oppose the atheism or, better, non-
theism of Buddhism . on the battleground of tolerance we must 
struggle for deeper insight and greater truth .69 
he goes an important step further, as do such theologians as Paul 
Tillich, and insists that Marxist theory is not as starkly atheistic and 
materialistic as it may appear or claim to be, on the surface . There is, at 
the very least, a genuine dimension of transcendence in Marxist thought:
Without faith in the experience of, and the encounter with, the 
Transcendent, in the reality of what really transcends world and 
time, we have no possibility of discovering meaning in history . 
This assertion will be strongly denied by non-religious thinkers 
whose philosophy of history seems capable of dispensing with con-
cepts such as faith and revelation, and even with all metaphysics . 
Whether they know it or not,…whosoever finds meaning in life 
or history cannot but base it on certain “assumptions”… . They 
result from a man’s confrontation with the Transcendent which 
he may wish to deny because he cannot grasp it… . In this way, 
“atheistic,” “scientific” Marxism lives by the faith in an inexorable 
goddess: history, who reveals herself in dialectics analysed by the 
priests and theologians of the Communist Party .70 
Ullmann similarly avoids a simplistic repudiation of Marxist “mate-
rialism .” he insists that for Marxists material goods are not themselves 
the ultimate goal of human activity but are rather themselves means 
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to the attainment of more inclusive forms of human happiness: “We 
must not think…that the ameliorating social activities of other agencies 
are normally aimed at nothing more than the material advancement 
of people . This is not true even for Marxism, whose declared aim is 
furtherance, through material advancement, of ‘the true happiness of 
the people’ while at the same time decrying religion as an other-worldly, 
hence ‘illusory happiness .’”71 
he believes that we can learn from Marxist analysis of western 
concepts of freedom as ideological concepts justifying bourgeois so-
ciety: “The marxist critique of the bourgeois-individualistic notion of 
freedom was quite as necessary as was the critique of existentialism of 
the marxist concept of science by which the ultimate inner freedom of 
the Self, intangible for society, is denied . We have learned one thing 
from marxist criticism, that the notion of freedom which may satisfy 
the sense of freedom, is largely influenced by the ideas of freedom 
prevailing in a society .”72 
another aspect of Marxist thought, which he subjects to criticism, 
is karl Marx’s notion that all of history, up to the time of the proletar-
ian revolution, is simply “pre-history .” Richard Ullmann finds more 
adequate Berdyaev’s characterization of the present and of the coming 
ages, respectively, as “history” and “meta-history”: “The use of ‘meta-
history’ for the time of utopia is more adequate than Marx’s attempt 
at calling the time of his utopian classless society ‘the true history of 
mankind,’ while dubbing ‘pre-history’ all ages before it . Is it for this 
reason that Marxists cherish so many ‘pre-historic’ methods of thought 
and action?”73 
Ullmann reserves even sharper criticism for two basic themes of 
Marxist thought: the notion of class war and the idea that the individual 
is the product of society:
as far as it is built on the idea of class war and hence on the 
ruthless elimination of the class enemy by whatever means, it is 
intolerable .…The real difficulty is not Communism as a system, 
but its many intolerable practices which are rooted in the fallacious 
assumption that man is the product of society . Society is not the 
product of man either, as Western individualism has taught . It is 
the nature of man that he exists only in society, and that all hu-
man morality derives from this mutual relationship . Communism, 
with its one-sided doctrine, presumes (unsuccessfully, of course) 
to treat man as a mere object of society, that is, in practice as an 
17
Palmer: Religion and Ethics in the Thought of Richard Ullman
Published by Digital Commons @ George Fox University, 1996
28 • t. vail palmer, Jr.
object of the people in power . To this extent, Communist doctrine 
is obnoxious and intolerable .74 
he insists, however, that these intolerable aspects of Marxist theory 
are not all-pervasive but are strictly limited in scope . Much more 
fundamental is his appreciation of Marxism’s redemptive concern for 
man’s essential humanity: “Communism, as an ideological system, far 
from denying the humanity of man, tries to redeem it even in the class 
enemy wherever this is thought possible; that is, it tries to save man 
from …his self-estrangement .”75 
In particular, Ullmann expresses a critical appreciation of Marxism’s 
devotion to equality and human welfare . In particular, these aspects of 
Marxist thought serve to differentiate Communism sharply from such 
social systems as Nazism and apartheid:
Ideologically: apartheid works for the inequality of man, Soviet 
Communism for greater equality . For this reason, I hold firmly, 
Soviet Communism is capable of redemption, apartheid not .
historically: the class society in Eastern countries which was 
broken by Communism was horribly unjust and, in this injus-
tice, claimed to be Christian, just like apartheid . admitted that 
Communism itself is socially more stratified than it supposes, and 
that it, too, has often used horrible violence, it does care funda-
mentally for the welfare of its people, as any welfare State does .76 
he has a similar attitude toward Soviet policies aimed at world 
peace: “We…should look twice before identifying the Christian Peace 
Conference of Prague with communist mass demonstrations which are 
concerned for ‘peace’ in the one-sided way of Soviet policies . Still, I 
would add that we should not underrate the genuine desire for peace 
even in the communist call for ‘co-existence .’”77 
In these scattered references to Marxism, Richard Ullmann raises a 
number of issues that clearly invite further discussion and study . he is 
barely on the verge of an open Christian-Marxist dialogue—a dialogue 
that was to blossom in the years immediately after his death . We can 
only imagine that the opportunity to enter into that ongoing dialogue 
might well have enriched the dialectic of his own Christian ethics .
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